This paper argues that the grammarians Bhat : t : oji Dīks : ita and Kaun : d : a Bhat : t : a did innovate in the realm of grammatical philosophy, without however admitting or perhaps even knowing it. Their most important innovation is the reinterpretation of the sphot : a. For reasons linked to new developments in sentence interpretation ( sābdabodha), in their hands the sphot : a became a semantic rather that an ontological entity.
In an earlier publication (Bronkhorst 2005), I have argued that Bhat : t : oji Dīks : ita was innovative in the philosophy of grammar. What I have tried to show there is that Bhat : t : oji introduced a notion of sphot : a which was essentially different from the sphot : a that had been used by all his predecessors. Before Bhat : t : oji the sphot : a had been an ontological entity: a word (the pada-sphot : a,
i.e., the sphot : a which is the word), to take an example, is an existent thing, different from the sounds of which, we might naively think, it is constituted. With Bhat : t : oji this changes: the sphot : a is for him a semantic entity, and therefore primarily a meaning-bearer. An individual sound can therefore be a sphot : a in the pre-Bhat : t : oji sense (it is an existing entity that is different from the vibrations that seem to constitute it), but not in Bhat : t : oji's sense (individual sounds have no meaning); when Bhat : t : oji speaks of varn : a-sphot : as, he is as a result referring not to sounds, but to (meaningful) morphemes. The point of departure of this paper is the conclusion of the earlier one: Bhat : t : oji did indeed innovate in the field of the philosophy of grammar. The questions to be addressed at present are: (i) why did he innovate? and (ii) did he know that he innovated?
With regard to the second question we observe that Bhat : t : oji went out of his way to show, unsuccessfully, that he had really nothing new to say. 1 This by itself does not of course prove that he did not know that he was innovating, but if he did he kept it to himself. We will return to this second question below, after a consideration of the first one. To answer the first question we will have a look at the intellectual context in which Bhat : t : oji made his innovation. I mention Bhat : t : oji's intellectual context, not his social, political or economic context. The reason is not that the latter is unimportant. The contrary is true. However, intellectual traditions are not fully determined by social, political and economic factors. Intellectual traditions have a momentum of their own which can, in sufficiently favorable circumstances, largely determine how they will continue. In the present context it is essential to recall that certain changes, intellectual changes, can be brought about by unresolved issues within the tradition. The intellectual currents that interest us at present are currents of rational thought, by which I mean to say that they try to eliminate contradictions and look for coherence. This implies, among other things, that they take into account the criticism they are subjected to and that they are sensitive to different opinions. Social and political factors may determine whose criticism our thinkers are willing to listen to, and whose opinions they are willing to consider, if only perhaps to reject them; pandits of the time of Bhat : t : oji were not keen to listen to criticism that came from without the Sanskrit tradition, nor were they ready to pay serious attention to opinions that were current outside their own group. But a great deal of criticism came from within the Sanskrit tradition, which harbored a variety of points of view. Scholars of this period compared their own positions with different ones current within the tradition. The differences constituted an ongoing challenge which new thinkers were free, or even encouraged, to take up.
